5-4 decision for Shaw majority opinion by Sandra Day O'Connor. In the meantime, our human resources manager will send you an application form. Id., at 357 (internal quotation marks omitted). I summed up my views on this matter in the plurality opinion in Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U. S. 109 (1986).3 Because districting inevitably is the expression of interest group politics, and because "the power to influence the political process is not limited to winning elections," id., at 132. Post, at 671 (WHITE, J., dissenting); see also post, at 684 (SOUTER, J., dissenting). As stated above, five Justices were of the view that, absent any contention that the proposed plan was adopted with the intent, or had the effect, of unduly minimizing the white majority's voting strength, the Fourteenth Amendment was not implicated. Cf. Nothing in the decision precludes white voters (or voters of any other race) from bringing the analytically distinct claim that a reapportionment plan rationally cannot be understood as anything other than an effort to segregate citizens into separate voting districts on the basis of race without sufficient justification." d. Suppose that patients in a certain control group are awake from 7 A.M. to 10 P.M. What is the average body temperature of such a patient over this wakeful period? See 425 U. S., at 142, n. 14. But it soon became apparent that guaranteeing equal access to the polls would not suffice to root out other racially discriminatory voting practices. 2. See App. Statement 102a. This case involves two of the most complex and sensitive issues this Court has faced in recent years: the meaning of the constitutional "right" to vote, and the propriety of racebased state legislation designed to benefit members of historically disadvantaged racial minority groups. The group claimed that the districts were racial gerrymanders that violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Pp. But just because there frequently will be a constitutionally permissible use of race in electoral districting, as exemplified by the consideration of race to comply with the Voting Rights Act (quite apart from the consideration of race to remedy a violation of the Act or the Consti-. 376 U. S., at 66-67. SHAW et al. With respect to this incident, one writer has observed that "understanding why the configurations are shaped as they are requires us to know at least as much about the interests of incumbent Democratic politicians, as it does knowledge of the Voting Rights Act." It was 160 miles long and generally corresponded to the Interstate 85 corridor. The Court today answers this question in the affirmative, and its answer is wrong. This will be true in areas where the minority population is geographically dispersed. But a principal consequence of school segregation was inequality in educational opportunity provided, whereas use of race (or any other group characteristic) in districting does not, without more, deny equality of political participation. On the same reasoning, I would affirm the District Court's dismissal of appellants' claim in this instance. United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U. S. 144, 161-162 (1977) (UJO) (pluralityopinion of WHITE, J., joined by Brennan, BLACKMUN, and STEVENS, JJ. 430 U. S., at 167-168 (opinion of WHITE, J., joined by STEVENS and REHNQUIST, JJ.). Shaw v. Reno is an important decision because it represents a conservative shift on the Court. Cf. A new issue of 20-year bonds: The flotation costs of the new bonds would be 4% of the proceeds. Indeed, the Voting Rights Act and our case law make clear that a reapportionment plan that satisfies 5 still may be enjoined as unconstitutional. US attorney general rejected a North Carolina congressional reappointment plan because the plan created only one black majority district, 1. It is true, of course, that one's vote may be more or less effective depending on the interests of the other individuals who are in one's district, and our cases recognize the reality that members of the same race often have shared interests. The State's revised plan contained a second majority-black district in the north-central region. cial harms that are not present in our vote-dilution cases. The Court characterizes the decision as "highly fractured," ante, at 651, but that should not detract attention from the rejection by a majority in UJO of the claim that the State's intentional creation of majority-minority districts transgressed constitutional norms. United States Supreme Court. The United States Supreme Court ruled that federal courts could hear and rule on cases in which plaintiffs allege that re-apportionment plans violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment . U. S. ", ity voters-surely they cannot complain of discriminatory treatment.6. ority as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone." Appellants, five North Carolina residents, filed this action against appellee state and federal officials, claiming that the State had created an unconstitutional racial gerrymander in violation of, among other things, the Fourteenth Amendment. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U. S. 448,524-525, n. 3 (1980) (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("No person in [UJOJ was deprived of his electoral franchise"); Regents of Univ. It is currently at its target debtequity ratio of .60. See, e. g., Feeney, supra, at 272; Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U. S. 124, 149 (1971); see also Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U. S. 55, 86 (1980) (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment) (Gomillion's holding "is compelled by the Equal Protection Clause"). to Juris. In other words, North Carolina was found by Congress to have" 'resorted to the extraordinary stratagem of contriving new rules of various kinds for the sole purpose of perpetuating voting discrimination in the face of adverse federal court decrees'" and therefore "would be likely to engage in 'similar maneuvers in the future in order to evade the remedies for voting discrimination contained in the Act itself.'" Accord, Wygant, 476 U. S., at 273 (plurality opinion). The court agreed unanimously that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction by reason of 14(b) of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U. S. C. 1973l(b), which vests the District Court for the District of Columbia with exclusive jurisdiction to issue injunctions against the execution of the Act and to enjoin actions taken by federal officers pursuant thereto. You can explore additional available newsletters here. The Court reasoned: "If these allegations upon a trial remained uncontradicted or unqualified, the conclusion would be irresistible, tantamount for all practical purposes to a mathematical demonstration, that the legislation is solely concerned with segregating white and colored voters by fencing Negro citizens out of town so as to deprive them of their pre-existing municipal vote." of Gal. Id., at 180 (Stewart, J., joined by Powell, J., concurring in judgment). But while district irregularities may provide strong indicia of a potential gerrymander, they do no more than that. The Cultural Landscape: An Introduction to Human Geography, AP Edition, Elliot Aronson, Robin M. Akert, Samuel R. Sommers, Timothy D. Wilson, Statistical Techniques in Business and Economics, Douglas A. Lind, Samuel A. Wathen, William G. Marchal, Chapter 14 and 15 Study Guide 8th BJU History. In short, even assuming that racial (or political) factors were considered in the drawing of district boundaries, a showing of discriminatory effects is a "threshold requirement" in the absence of which there is no equal protection violation, id., at 143, and no need to "reach the question of the state interests served by the particular districts," id., at 142.4, To distinguish a claim that alleges that the redistricting scheme has discriminatory intent and effect from one that does not has nothing to do with dividing racial classifications between the "benign" and the malicious-an enterprise which, as the majority notes, the Court has treated with skepticism. I respectfully dissent. But the State must have a "'strong basis in evidence for [concluding] that remedial action [is] necessary.'" Beer v. United States, 425 U. S. 130, 144 (1976) (WHITE, J., dissenting). Affirmative Action and Minority Voting Rights 44 (1987). Ante, at 653; see also ante, at 658.8, Nonetheless, in those cases where this cause of action is sufficiently pleaded, the State will have to justify its decision to consider race as being required by a compelling state interest, and its use of race as narrowly tailored to that interest. 657-658. Though they might be dissatisfied at the prospect of casting a vote for a losing candidate-a lot shared by many, including a disproportionate number of minor-, its black citizens with respect to their exercise of the voting franchise from approximately 1900 to 1970 by employing a poll tax [and] a literacy test. After the General Assembly passed legislation creating the second district, a group of white voters in North Carolina, led by Ruth O. Shaw, sued on the grounds that the district was an unconstitutional gerrymander . Until today, the Court has analyzed equal protection claims involving race in electoral districting differently from equal protection claims involving other forms of governmental conduct, and before turning to the different regimes of analysis it will be useful to set out the relevant respects in which such districting differs from the characteristic circumstances in which a State might otherwise consciously consider race. But we have held that such principles are not constitutionally required, with the consequence that their absence cannot justify the distinct constitutional regime put in place by the Court today. of Elections, 393 U. S. 544, 569 (1969) (emphasis added). to Brief for Federal Appellees lOa. Accordingly, they held that plaintiffs were not entitled to relief under the Constitution's Equal Protection Clause. Croson, 488 U. S., at 494 (plurality opinion); see also id., at 520 (SCALIA, J., concurring in judgment). 7 I borrow the term "segregate" from the majority, but, given its historical connotation, believe that its use is ill advised. 639-642. Sickels, Dragons, Bacon Strips, and Dumbbells-Who's Afraid of Reapportionment?, 75 Yale L. J. In our view, the District Court properly dismissed appellants' claims against the federal appellees. The Court has abandoned settled law to decide this case. (b) Classifications of citizens based solely on race are by their nature odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality, because they threaten to stigmatize persons by reason of their membership in a racial group and to incite racial hostility. First, they suggest that a racial gerrymander of the sort alleged here is functionally equivalent to gerrymanders for nonracial purposes, such as political gerrymanders. The message that such districting sends to elected representatives is equally pernicious. Justice Whittaker, however, concluded that the "unlawful segregation of races of citizens" into different voting districts was cognizable under the Equal Protection Clause. The State has made no mystery of its intent, which was to respond to the Attorney General's objections, see Brief for State Appellees 13-14, by improving the minority group's prospects of electing a candidate of its choice. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301, 309-313 (1966). Petitioners'. 9 The Court says its new cause of action is justified by what I understand to be some ingredients of stigmatic harm, see ante, at 647-648, and by a "threa[t] to our system of representative democracy," ante, at 650, both caused by the mere adoption of a districting plan with the elements I have described in the text, supra, at 685. North Carolina's failure to respect these principles, in Judge Voorhees' view, "augur[ed] a constitutionally suspect, and potentially unlawful, intent" sufficient to defeat the state appellees' motion to dismiss. Even so, the individual's right is infringed only if the racial minority can prove that it has 'essentially been shut out of the political process.''' When a district obviously is created solely to effectuate the perceived common interests of one racial group, elected officials are more likely to believe that their primary obligation is to represent only the members of that group, rather than their constituency as a whole. A consequence of this categorical approach is the absence of any need for further searching "scrutiny" once it has been shown that a given districting decision has a purpose and effect falling within one of those categories. Beer v. United States, 425 U. S. 130, 141 (1976). What trade-offs are involved in deciding to have a single large, centrally located facility instead of to Juris. Accordingly, the Court held that such schemes violate the Fourteenth Amendment when they are adopted with a discriminatory purpose and have the effect of diluting minority voting strength. See, e. g., Croson, 488 U. S., at 491-493 (opinion of O'CONNOR, J., joined by REHNQUIST, C. J., and WHITE, J. But in the context of a Fourteenth Amendment challenge, courts must bear in mind the difference between what the law permits and what it requires. Nor, because of the distinctions between the two categories, is there any risk that Fourteenth Amendment districting law as such will be taken to imply anything for purposes of general Fourteenth Amendment scrutiny about "benign" racial discrimination, or about group entitlement as distinct from individual protection, or about the appropriateness of strict or other heightened scrutiny. In their complaint, appellants did not claim that the General Assembly's reapportionment plan unconstitutionally "diluted" white voting strength. Petitioner Argument (Shaw) 1. Following is the Case Brief for Baker v. Carr, United States Supreme Court, (1962) Case Summary of Baker v. Carr: A Tennessee resident brought suit against the Secretary of State claiming that the failure to redraw the legislative districts every ten years, as outlined in the state constitution, resulted in rural votes holding more votes . Brief for State Appellees 5, n. 6. 92-357. Croson, supra, at 493 (plurality opinion); UJO, supra, at 173 (Brennan, J., concurring in part) ("[E]ven in the pursuit of remedial objectives, an explicit policy of assignment by race may serve to stimulate our society's latent race consciousness, suggesting the utility and propriety of basing decisions on a factor that ideally bears no relationship to an individual's worth or needs"). cases of electoral districting and one for most other types of state governmental decisions. The shape of the district at issue in this case is indeed so bizarre that few other examples are ever likely to carry the unequivocal implication of impermissible use of race that the Court finds here. *, JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. in M1 and M2? In determining whether a use of race is permissible in cases in which there is a bizarrely shaped district, we can readily look to its effects, just as we would in evaluating any other electoral districting scheme. With these considerations in mind, we have limited such claims by insisting upon a showing that "the political processes were not equally open to participation by the group in question-that its members had less opportunity than did other residents in the district to participate in the political processes and to elect legislators of their choice." It is ironic that it does so when white voters challenge a law that would have North Carolina send a black representative to Congress for the first time since Reconstruction, here is no constitutional requirement of compactness or contiguity for districts. Rule Civ. If it is permissible to draw boundaries to provide adequate representation for rural voters, for union members, for Hasidic Jews, for Polish Americans, or for Republicans, it necessarily follows that it is permissible to do the same thing for members of the very minority group whose history in the United States gave birth to the Equal Protection Clause. Supp., at 476-477 (Voorhees, C. J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). It applied a three-part test, examining intent, effects, and causation. A. Croson Co., 488 U. S. 469 (1989) (city contracting); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. It reinforces the perception that members of the same racial group-regardless of their age, education, economic status, or the community in which they live-think alike, share the same political interests, and will prefer the same candidates at the polls. Thus, "an equal protection violation may be found only where the electoral system substantially disadvantages certain voters in their opportunity to influence the political process effectively." The central explanation has to do with the nature of the redistricting process. 4 The majority's use of "segregation" to describe the effect of districting here may suggest that it carries effects comparable to school segregation making it subject to like scrutiny. Appellants allege that the revised plan, which contains district boundary lines of dramatically irregular shape, consti-. What appellants object to is redistricting legislation that is so extremely irregular on its face that it rationally can be viewed only as an effort to segregate the races for purposes of voting, without regard for traditional districting principles and without sufficiently compelling justification. Racial gerrymandering, even for remedial purposes, may balkanize us into competing racial factions; it threatens to carry us further from the goal of a political system in which race no longer matters--a goal that the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments embody, and to which the Nation continues to aspire. T. HOMAS. In Beer, we held that a reapportionment plan that created one majorityminority district where none existed before passed muster under 5 because it improved the position of racial minorities. Thus, state legislation that expressly distinguishes among citizens on account of race-whether it contains an explicit distinction or is "unexplainable on grounds other than race," Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U. S. 252, 266-must be narrowly tailored to further a compelling governmental interest. facilitating the election of a member of an identifiable group of voters? See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U. S., at 118-127. A. Thernstrom, Whose Votes Count? See, e. g., Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U. S. 339,341. whether appellants' complaint stated a claim under constitutional provisions other than the Fourteenth Amendment. A second distinction between districting and most other governmental decisions in which race has figured is that those other decisions using racial criteria characteristically occur in circumstances in which the use of race to the advantage of one person is necessarily at the obvious expense of a member of a different race. The first involves direct and outright deprivation of the right to vote, for example by means of a poll tax or literacy test. The state appellees submit that two pieces of evidence gave the General Assembly a strong basis for believing that remedial action was warranted here: the Attorney General's imposition of the 5 preclearance requirement on 40 North Carolina counties, and the Gingles District Court's findings of a long history of official racial discrimination in North Carolina's political system and of pervasive racial bloc voting. By a 2-to-1 vote, the District Court also dismissed the complaint against the state appellees. As a result of the 1990 census, North Carolina gained one congressional seat, increasing its House membership to twelve and requiring the state legislature to redraw the state's congressional districts. The Constitution does not call for equal sized districts . 3 The majority does not acknowledge that we require such a showing from plaintiffs who bring a vote dilution claim under 2 of the Voting Rights Act. These arguments were not developed below, and the issues remain open for consideration on remand. Legislation that classifies a person or group of people solely based on their race is, by its nature, a threat to a system that strives to achieve equality, the majority opined. 392 (WDNC), and this Court summarily affirmed, 506 U. S. 801 (1992). It is also unnecessary to decide at this stage of the litigation whether the plan advances a state interest distinct from the Act: eradicating the effects of past racial discrimination. Students in AP Gov't and Politics are required to know both cases as part of the cannon of cases and the precedents set as part of the course standards. The Court extended the reasoning of Gomillion to congressional districting in Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U. S. 52 (1964). Redistricting advantage for blacks faces more scrutiny than an advantage for a non-minority. SHAW v. RENO (1993) AP U.S. Government and Politics Study Guide IMPACT The decision in Shaw v. Reno led to nationwide changes after the 2000 Census. Draper reviewed the receivables list from the January transactions. claim in UJO was that the State had "violated the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments by deliberately revising its reapportionment plan along racial lines." 2. Enduring Legacy. That racial bloc voting or minority political cohesion may be found to exist in some cases, of course, is no reason to treat all racial gerrymanders differently from other kinds of racial classification. It therefore warrants different analysis. Not very long ago, of course, it was argued that minority groups defined by race were the only groups the Equal Protection Clause protected in this context. Give examples of input devices for computer systems. A covered jurisdiction's interest in creating majority-minority districts in order to comply with the nonretrogression rule under 5 of the Voting Rights Act does not give it carte blanche to engage in racial gerrymandering. Nor, because of the distinctions between the two categories, is there any risk that Fourteenth Amendment districting law as such will be taken to imply anything for purposes of general Fourteenth Amendment scrutiny about "benign" racial discrimination, or about group entitlement as distinct from individual protection, or about the appropriateness of strict or other heightened scrutiny.7. See Growe v. Emison, 507 U. S. 25, 40-41 (1993) ("Unless these points are established, there neither has been a wrong nor can be a remedy"). Indeed, because most of the nonwhite voters lived together in one area, it would have been difficult to construct voting districts without concentrations of nonwhite voters. In providing the reasons for the objection, the Attorney General noted that "[f]or the south-central to southeast area, there were several plans drawn providing for a second majority-minority congressional district" and that such a district would have been no more irregular than others in the State's plan. One of the lower court judges described it as winding in a snakelike fashion through tobacco country, financial centers, and manufacturing areas until it gobbled up enough enclaves of black neighborhoods to create a majority-black district. See supra, at 647-649. Supreme Court rulings in the Shaw v. Reno (1995) and the Shelby County vs. Holder (2013) cases relied heavily on the reasoning behind the passage of the Voting Rights Act (1965). Nor was it ever in doubt that "the State deliberately used race in a purposeful manner." Writing for three Members of the Court, I justified this conclusion as follows: "It is true that New York deliberately increased the nonwhite majorities in certain districts in order to enhance the opportunity for election of nonwhite representatives from those districts. Appellants sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the state appellees. Under our cases there is in general a requirement that in order to obtain relief under the Fourteenth Amendment, the purpose and effect of the districting must be to devalue the effectiveness of a voter compared to what, as a group member, he would otherwise be able to enjoy. 92-357 Argued: April 20, 1993 Decided: June 28, 1993. The only justification I can imagine would be the preservation of "sound districting principles," such as compactness and contiguity. O. Gade & H. Stillwell, North Carolina: People and Environments 65-68 (1986). Every Member of the Court assumed that the plaintiffs' allegation that the statute "segregate[d] eligible voters by race and place of origin" stated a constitutional claim. With him on the briefs were Michael F. Easley, Attorney General of North Carolina, Edwin M. Speas, Jr., Senior, Deputy Attorney General, and Norma S. Harrell and Tiare B. Smiley, Special Deputy Attorneys General. 506 U. S. 1019 (1992). See Karcher, supra, at 776 (WHITE, J., dissenting); Wells v. Rockefeller, 394 U. S. 542, 554 (1969) (WHITE, J., dissenting). 21A375 is treated as a . But as JUSTICE WHITE points out, see ante, at 672 (dissenting opinion), and as the Court acknowledges, see ante, at 647, we have held that such principles are not constitutionally required, with the consequence that their absence cannot justify the distinct constitutional regime put in place by the Court today. In our view, the court used the wrong analysis. Justia Annotations is a forum for attorneys to summarize, comment on, and analyze case law published on our site. When an assumption that people in a particular minority group (whether they are defined by the political party, religion, ethnic group, or race to which they belong) will vote in a particular way is used to benefit that group, no constitutional violation occurs. Id., at 151-152 (emphasis added). Croson, supra, at 500 (quoting Wygant, supra, at 277 (plurality opinion)). Chief Judge Voorhees agreed that race-conscious redistricting is not per se unconstitutional but dissented from the rest of the majority's equal protection analysis. In other words, the statute was invalid because, on its face, it could not be explained on grounds other than race. v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265, 359 (1978) (Brennan, WHITE, Marshall, and BLACKMUN, JJ., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part)); 488 U. S., at 514-516 (STEVENS, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (undertaking close examination of the characteristics of the advantaged and disadvantaged racial groups said to justify the disparate treatment although declining to articulate different standards of review); see also Wygant v. Jackson Bd. shape of the district lines could "be explained only in racial terms." 808 F. Gomillion thus supports appellants' contention that district lines obviously drawn for the purpose of separating voters by race require careful scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause regardless of the motivations underlying their adoption. In a similar vein, Justice Stewart was joined by Justice Powell in stating: "The petitioners have made no showing that a racial criterion was used as a basis for denying them their right to vote, in contravention of the Fifteenth Amendment. The same principle pertains in nondistricting aspects of voting law, where race-based discrimination places the disfavored voters at the disadvantage of exclusion from the franchise without any alternative benefit. Our conclusion is supported by the plurality opinion in UJO, in which four Justices determined that New York's creation of additional majority-minority districts was constitutional because the plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate that the State "did more than the Attorney General was authorized to require it to do under the nonretrogression principle of Beer." For the following sentence, locate the action verb and underline it twice. Majority Opinion/Decision. Member of an identifiable group of voters: April 20, 1993 is not per se unconstitutional dissented... Settled law to decide this case potential gerrymander, they held that plaintiffs were not below. Race-Conscious redistricting is not per se unconstitutional but dissented from the January transactions 357 internal! 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